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Enlistment in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force 1914-1918
A Re-evaluation1
C H R I S  S H A R P E
Abstract: Critical analysis of Canada’s recruitment for the war effort has 
three main themes. The first is that the government undertook to raise an 
expeditionary force too large to be maintained by voluntary enlistment. 
As a result, conscription for overseas service had to be imposed, creating 
enduring rifts between regions and linguistic groups. The second is that 
too few Canadian-born men enlisted. The third is that the low enlistment 
rate among French-Canadians was a national embarrassment. This paper 
examines the regional patterns of enlistment, evaluates the arguments 
advanced to explain the French-Canadian ambivalence to the war, and 
concludes that conscription was necessary
E v a l u a t i o n s  o f  C a n a d a ’s military contribution to the First World War generally incorporate three themes: that voluntary 
enlistment fell short of the need; that Canadian-born men did not 
do their fair share; and that the shortcomings of the national effort
1 The first version of this paper appeared thirty years ago. See C.A. Sharpe, 
“Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918: A Regional Analysis,” 
Journal of Canadian Studies 18 (1984), 15-29. No new data have become available since 
then although efforts to refine our knowledge of Great War enlistments are ongoing. For 
example, see Jonathan F. Vance, “Provincial Patterns of Enlistment in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Military History 17 (2008), 75-78. This paper 
consolidates and refines some of the data on Canada’s military contribution to the War 
and corrects some errors of calculation. It also integrates some of the new scholarship 
relevant to a critical evaluation of the three themes outlined in the opening paragraph.
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were largely the fault of the province of Quebec which had the lowest 
enlistment rate in the country. In what might be characterised as a 
typical, self-deprecating Canadian attitude, the never-ending debate 
over these questions continues to cast a shadow over the legacy of 
what has been described as the “Shock Army of the British Empire.”2 
This paper is a critical evaluation of these themes.
T H E  C O M M I T T M E N T
When His Majesty’s Government announced a state of war with 
Germany on 4 August 1914, Canada, as well as the Dominions of 
Australia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, was also at war. Until 
the 1931 Statute of Westminster, the autonomy of dominions 
extended only to internal affairs. They had no role in formulating 
foreign policy, no authority to declare war or make peace, and had 
played no part in the cascade of diplomatic exchanges which led to 
the catastrophe. None had been consulted before the declaration of 
war. All Canada reserved was the right to decide the form and size 
of her contribution. Hoping to demonstrate that the country was 
a valuable part of the empire and deserving of more recognition 
than she had hitherto been awarded, the government placed great 
significance on battlefield successes.3 The most iconic was Vimy 
Ridge, where the Canadian Corps achieved a tactical victory which 
had eluded all previous attackers.4 The emergence of Canada as a 
nation is still frequently tied to this event. Speaking at the Vimy 
Memorial in 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said “every 
nation has a creation story to tell. The First World War and Vimy 
are central to the story of our country.”5
The immediate Canadian response to the declaration of war was 
enthusiastic. The size of the initial rush of recruits can be explained
2 Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in 
the Last 100 Days of the Great War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).
3 Jeffrey A. Keshen, “The Great War Soldiers as Nation-Builders in Canada and 
Australia,” 3-26, in Canada and the Great War, Briton C. Busch, ed. (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 20.
4 Terry Copp, “The Military Effort, 1914-1918,” 35-61, in Canada and the First 
World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, David MacKenzie, ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 51.
5 Margaret MacMillan, The Uses and Abuses of History (Toronto: Penguin, 2008), 68.
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in part by the widespread belief that the fighting would be over 
by Christmas.6 It also reflected the high levels of unemployment 
in urban-based manufacturing industry, and the prospect of poor 
harvests, especially in the Prairies. By the end of 1914 almost 60,000 
men and women had offered themselves for service in the newly- 
created Canadian Expeditionary Force (c e f ). Although more than 
seventy percent of these men were British-born the fact that native- 
born Canadians were initially unenthusiastic about fighting for king 
and empire was not an issue in 1914. But it was soon to become a 
source of national concern.7
With the benefit of hindsight, the story of Canada’s commitment 
to the war effort might be called ‘two divisions too many’. The 
political and cultural problems which followed the imposition of 
conscription in 1917, and the century-long anguish over whether 
Canadians made an adequate military contribution to the war 
effort might never had occurred if the government had not made 
what many have argued was a hasty and ill-advised decision about 
the size of the expeditionary force that it was prepared to send 
overseas. War planning is an inexact science and in the fall of 1914 
no Canadian politician or soldier could realistically have predicted 
that the war would last more than four years, and cost almost
67,000 Canadian lives. But if Prime Minister Robert Borden had 
been less concerned with his efforts to expand Canada’s role in 
imperial affairs, and more inclined to listen to the advice he was 
given by his military advisors, the Canadian war effort might not 
have been extended beyond the country’s ability to maintain it on 
a voluntary basis.
Two days after war was declared the Cabinet authorised the 
creation of an active service force. On 8 August Sir George Perley, 
acting Canadian high commissioner in London (and soon to become 
the minister of overseas forces of Canada), advised Prime Minister 
Sir Robert Borden that Lord Kitchener, British minister of war, was
6 The hope and, indeed, expectation that the war would be short was shared by 
more than just the first groups of eager recruits. European civilian and military 
leaders expected, and had planned for a short, decisive war, knowing that a conflict 
prolonged by the increasing advantages of defenders, would raise the spectre of 
defeat and inevitable social upheaval. See Margaret MacMillan, The War That 
Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013), 334.
7 Ronald G. Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career or a Controversial Canadian, 
1885-1916 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1986), 202.
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very grateful for the “splendid offer” of Canadian troops, and “hopes 
you can send him full division of twenty to twenty-five thousand. 
Says he can use all you think best to send.”8 Although the authorised 
strength of the force was set at 25,000 on 10 August, Kitchener 
got more than that. On 3 October a thirty-ship convoy departed 
for England carrying 31,200 Canadian soldiers— the largest military 
force that had ever crossed the Atlantic as a unit.9
The authorised strength of the c e f  was doubled to 50,000 on 7 
November. At this point Major-General Gwatkin, the sensible old 
British soldier who was chief of the Canadian General Staff, told 
Prime Minister Borden that maintaining a field force of this size was 
the maximum contribution the country ought to undertake, since 
nobody knew how long the war might last and the required ratio 
of enlistments to men at the front would be at least three to one.10 
Perley warned Borden that Canada should not commit to providing 
more divisions than she could reinforce and suggested that two full 
divisions with reserves, totaling twelve to fifteen thousand men, 
was likely the practical limit. Borden also heard from the Deputy 
Minister of Militia and Defence Colonel Eugene Fiset who advised 
“having regard to what war wastage means, it would be better to 
concentrate effort on the raising and training of reinforcements than 
to go on adding to the number of units at the front.”11 All this sage 
advice was ignored.
At the end of May 1915 the War Office, taken aback by the number 
of casualties sustained during the German spring offensive, announced 
that His Majesty’s Government would “accept with deep gratitude an
8 C.P. Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada. Volume V. The Arts of War and 
Peace. 1914-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), 550.
9 G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1962), 29. Nicolson claims the number of men in the convoy was approximately 
6,000 more than had been promised, or who had been planned for. But at a meeting 
at Valcartier on 21 September, attended by Borden and other members of the 
Cabinet, it was decided that all effective men would be sent overseas, so that no 
accepted volunteers would be left behind. Nic Clarke suggests even this number 
under-estimates the number of volunteers who came forward, since 3,050 men were 
rejected as medically unfit and about 2,000 more for other reasons. Nic Clarke, “ 
‘You will not be going to this war’: The rejected volunteers of the First Contingent 
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” First War Studies 1, (2010), 163.
10 J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription 
in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 22.
11 Quoted In C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian 
External Policies Volume I: 1867-1921 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1981), 178.
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even larger army than already provided or contemplated.”12 Ignoring 
the practical considerations, Borden raised the authorised strength to
150,000 on 8 July.
Then, during the summer of 1915, the prime minister visited 
England and France. Here he became aware for the first time of the 
scale of the war and its enormous hunger for men. Upon his return to 
Canada the strength of the c e f  was raised to 250,000. Then, on 30 
December during a meeting with the ministers of militia and defence, 
finance, and customs, he proposed that the authorised strength of the 
force should be increased to 500,000. They agreed, and apparently, 
with no more consultation than that, Borden told the nation of this 
decision in his New Year’s message, reflecting his firm commitment 
to a vague aspiration, based on his unshakable belief that Canada’s 
non-existent influence over British war policy could be increased by 
a larger military contribution.13
The resulting Order-in-Council of 12 January 1917 authorised the 
minister of militia and defence to “raise, equip and send overseas 
(emphasis supplied) ... officers and men not exceeding 500,000.” This 
was a huge undertaking for a country of only eight million. With the 
benefit of hindsight we can ask the questions that should have been 
asked at the time. How many of the approximately one-and-a-half 
million men of military age in Canada were fit? Would one-third of 
them volunteer?14 Minister of Finance Sir Thomas White was later to 
reflect, “none of us had any clear idea as to how so many additional 
men could be raised or where the necessary men would come from.
. We simply went on faith, feeling instinctively that means could 
be found to carry it out.”15 Means were found, but they left a bitter 
legacy because before the year was out, conscription for overseas 
service had been imposed.
To most Canadian historians, the wording of the order is clear. 
The intent was not to enlist that number of men, but to create and 
maintain an overseas force of a half-million men, some of whom would
12 Ibid., 177.
13 Ibid., 191.
14 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, Fifth Edn. (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 2007), 135.
15 Quoted in Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, Volume II: 
1914-1937 (Toronto: MacMillan, 1975), 34.
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Figure i: Strength of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada 
(excluding Railway and Forestry Troops, troops attached to Imperial Forces and
Source: Report of the Director of the Operation of the Military Service Act, Sessional Paper 
246, 1919.
serve in Canada.16 Given the contemporary estimate that monthly 
casualties and ‘wastage’ would be five percent of strength, an estimate 
which turned out to be woefully inadequate, maintaining a force of a 
half-million would require the annual enlistment of 300,000 additional 
men. This number could not possibly be obtained under a voluntary 
system. The number of enlistments in the c e f , including conscripts, 
is generally accepted as 619,636, but the peak strength of the c e f  did 
not exceed 388,000-118,000 at home and 270,000 overseas (Figure i).17
16 See Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 215; Haycock, Sam Hughes; Robert 
Craig Brown and Donald Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith: Recruiting the cef  1914­
1918,” Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 51, (1984), 53-79; and Granatstein 
and Hitsman, Broken Promises.
17 The reported number of enlistments is based on an analysis of the attestation 
papers by Col. A.F.Duguid and his staff in the 1930s. In his discussion of the potential 
sources of error in the analysis, Morton notes that “at least 21,097 men admitted to 
having served earlier in the c e f ” and were, therefore, double-counted. It is important, 
then, to distinguish between the number of enlistments in the cef  and the number of 
individual men and women who enlisted. Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: 
The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 277.
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The question “is Canada doing its share?” became a major 
preoccupation as early as the summer of 1917. Critics said that to 
equal Australia’s contribution Canada should have had a half-million 
men overseas by the beginning of the year; to equal New Zealand’s, 
450,000; and more than 400,000 to equal South Africa’s. But Canada 
had only 284,000 officers and men in England and France.18 The 
government had authorised an armed force of 500,000 but had not 
guaranteed that level would be reached. But nice round numbers 
announced by politicians have a tendency to take on a life of their 
own. Public opinion considered this one to be cast in stone, and the 
government’s failure to “redeem the pledge“ was widely criticised.19
The situation may not be as clear-cut, or as uncomplimentary to 
Canada as is often suggested. Australia raised six infantry and one 
mounted division and also contributed men to a joint New Zealand- 
Australian division. The men in these units represented about thirty- 
nine percent of the total number of eighteen to forty-five-year-old 
men. The comparable number for Canada is about forty-eight percent. 
Data in the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire 
are limited to ‘white males’, and in the Canadian case to men born 
in Canada or Britain. On this basis the overseas Canadian contingent 
represented 29.5 percent of the age-eligible men; the Australian, 30.1 
percent. Total enlistment represented 32.2 percent of the eligible 
Canadian men; 30.8 percent of the Australian. Playing with such 
numbers is a fool’s game, but there is evidence that the Australian 
comparison is not as invidious as often suggested.20
Canadian tradition has been to raise an army of paid volunteers 
when required, rather than maintain a large standing army. In 1914 
Canada had a regular army of only 3,110 men, supported by about
74,000 members of the militia, an “exceedingly urban and English”
18 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External 
Policies, Volume I: 1867-1921 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 68.
19 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 217. Pressure on the government was 
increased by comparisons with the seemingly greater efforts of other members of the 
empire. Britain raised seventy-five infantry and eight cavalry divisions to Canada’s 
five so that in terms of divisions relative to population size, the British efforts was 
about three times that of Canada’s. See Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 178.
20 Australia provided 400,000 men out of a total population of 5 million. Canada 
provided about 620,000 men (and women) out of a total population of about 7.5 
million. The armed forces of both countries, then, amounted to 8 percent of their total 
populations. By this token, Canada did not fall short of its expected contribution, 
although the myth that Australia made a larger contribution than Canada persists.
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force that was in many cases little more than an excuse to dispense 
social and political patronage.21 Many of the men did not even 
undergo the annual minimum twelve days of training.22 The raising of 
a ‘hostilities only’ army, entirely in keeping with Canadian tradition 
dating back to the first Militia Bill in 1868, was based on the belief, 
firmly held by Minister of Militia Sam Hughes, that the best soldiers 
were citizens fighting to defend their homes.23 In the Canadian case 
the myth seemed reinforced by the fact that from the summer of 
1917 onwards the Canadian Corps was commanded by Sir Arthur 
Currie, a real estate salesman from Victoria, British Columbia who 
had started his military career as a militia gunner.24
The Act Respecting the Militia and Defence of Canada (1904) 
required that:
All the male inhabitants of Canada, of the age 18 years and upwards, 
and under 60, not exempt or disqualified by law, and being British 
subjects, shall be liable to service in the Militia: provided that the 
Governor General may require all the male inhabitants of Canada, 
capable of bearing arms, to serve in the case of a levee en masse.
21 John Swettenham, ed. Valiant Men: Canada’s Victoria Cross and George Cross 
Winners (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), viii.
22 Curtis Mainville, “Committing to War: Compulsory Service and the Limitations 
of Canadian Mobilization, 1914-1918,” Unpublished paper, Department of History, 
University of Ottawa, no date, 2.
23 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 12.
24 James Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921 
(Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 5. Canada had in place 
a mobilisation plan for an overseas contingent, prepared in secret by British and 
Canadian staff officers during 1911, in case “one day the Dominion government might 
decide to mobilise for active service for overseas a Canadian contingent, consisting 
of a division and a mounted brigade.” It aimed to create a regionally and ‘racially’ 
balanced force of unmarried volunteers aged between twenty and thirty-five, based on 
the existing militia organisation, with “its war outfit adapted to meet the requirements 
of active service in a civilized country in a temperate climate.” However Colonel Sam 
Hughes, minister of militia and defence, ignored this plan and replaced it with a 
scheme of his own devising which was characterised as ‘chaotic’ even at the time. 
This strange episode in Canadian military history is well-discussed elsewhere. See 
A.F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War (Ottawa: 
King’s Printer, 1938); Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918; Desmond 
Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics; and James Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the 
Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
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However, the decision to create an overseas expeditionary force 
faced significant legal difficulties. Section 69 of the Act was very 
clear: “The Governor in Council may place the Militia, or any part 
thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond 
Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears 
advisable so to do by reason of emergency.” Could men fighting 
in France or Belgium be reasonably considered to be defending 
Canada? And what status would they have? The Militia Order 
of 17 August 1914, issued on the authority of the War Office, 
declared that the c e f  would be imperial, and have the status of 
British regular troops. The term ‘imperial’ was used to designate 
troops raised by direct order of the king beyond the limits of the 
United Kingdom and India, commanded by British officers and 
maintained by an annual vote of the British Parliament.25 But the 
c e f  was to be raised and paid for by the Canadian government, 
and the men considered part of a volunteer militia which had been 
deployed overseas to defend their country. Was this legal? It was 
an unprecedented situation, requiring a clever solution.26 Until 11 
August 1914, volunteering was restricted to members of the Non­
Permanent Active Militia or the Permanent Force. Thereafter there 
were no restrictions, but any man not belonging to one of these 
organisations was first enrolled in a militia unit. Militiamen were 
then assigned to a newly-created c e f  battalion for overseas service. 
‘Attestation’ as the process was known, required the recruit to 
declare a willingness to serve under the Army Act “for the term 
of one year, or during the war now existing between Great Britain 
and Germany should that war last longer than one year, and for 
six months after the termination of that war provided His Majesty 
should so long require my services or until legally discharged” and 
“taking a personal oath of allegiance to His Majesty King George 
the Fifth, his heirs and successors.”27
25 Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, Vol. II, appendix 8.
26 George F.G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary 
People (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), 313.
27 David W. Love, “A Call to Arms”: The Organization and Administration of 
Canada’s Military in World War One (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1999), 63.
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T H E  G E O G R A P H Y  O F  E N L I S T M E N T  I N  C A N A D A
The c e f  included three components: the men who enlisted voluntarily, 
those who were conscripted under the Military Service Act of 1917, and the 
Nursing Sisters, all of whom were volunteers. Where did they come from?
Assessing the regional pattern of enlistments requires an 
appropriate baseline population. Some discussions of regional 
enlistment patterns simply use the number of males aged eighteen to 
forty-five (1,726,873) from the Census of 1911 (Appendix: Table i).28 
Brown and Loveridge use 1,888,825, the number of such men reported 
in the Canada Year Book 1913.29 Stacey used 7,993,000, the estimates 
of total 1916 population from the 1938 Canada Year Book.30 All these 
numbers, especially Stacey’s, are too large because they include men 
who were ineligible for military service. Only British subjects were 
eligible.31 The Militia Act provided that men up to the age of sixty 
could be called, but the normal limit was forty-five. All Canadian- 
and British-born men were eligible, but nearly 190,000 of the foreign- 
born were not because they were still un-naturalised aliens (Table i i ). 
Arriving at an estimate of the number of men eligible for recruitment 
requires that they be subtracted from the total. This cannot be done 
precisely, but the number used here is the best possible approximation 
of the size of the pool of eligible men. The 1911 census gives the number 
of foreign-born males aged twenty-one and over and still classed as 
aliens. The number of ineligible foreign-born males was estimated by 
multiplying the number of all foreign-born males by the proportion 
of foreign-born males over the age of twenty-one and still alien, and 
subtracting this number from the total. The effect of this admittedly 
crude adjustment, which eliminates 189,701 men, is negligible in 
eastern Canada, but significant in the Prairies. The pool of eligible 
men is reduced by twelve percent in Manitoba, eighteen percent in 
Saskatchewan, twenty-four percent in Alberta and thirty-two percent
28 Note that the tables for this article can be found in an Appendix located at the 
end of the article.
29 Brown and Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith,” 73.
30 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 225.
31 The status of ‘Canadian Citizen’ was created under the Citizenship Act of 1910, 
and the period of domicile required of foreign-born people who wished to become 
citizens increased from three to five years. However, Canadian citizenship as a 
category separate from ‘British subject’ did not exist until the Canadian Citizenship 
Act came into force on 1 January, 1947.
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R ecruiting soldiers in front o f  city  hall. Toronto, O ntario, 13 M arch 1916. [Library and Archives 
Canada PA 072627]
in British Columbia. Tables i and ii  show the provincial distribution of 
men aged eighteen to forty-five and Table v i  the estimated number of 
eligible men. Almost sixty percent of them lived in Ontario and Quebec.
The c e f  Attestation Paper asked “In what Town, Township or 
Parish and in what Country were you born?” Data on the specific 
place of birth of all men and women in the c e f  was therefore recorded, 
but has almost never been used as the basis for further calculation. 
Furthermore, most discussions of enlistment patterns use data based 
on the place of enlistment, rather than place of birth. Comparing 
the two provides differing perspectives on the composition of the 
c e f  (Table i v ). As one would expect, the number of c e f  members 
born in the Prairie provinces is low. One had to be born in 1900 or 
earlier to meet the minimum age requirement for enlistment, and 
this part of the country was not heavily populated prior to the turn 
of the century. The relatively large number of men who signed their 
attestation papers in one of these provinces indicates the volume of 
westward settlement which had occurred by 1914.
Several factors have been proposed to explain the regional patterns 
of enlistment. Stacey suggests that what he called the “evident high 
degree of indifference to the war” in Saskatchewan might be the fact that
11
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110,279 (twenty-two percent) of its residents had German or Austro- 
Hungarian ancestry.32 Just over sixteen percent of the total population 
of the three Prairie provinces were of German or Austro-Hungarian 
origin but there is no way of knowing how far back it might be in the 
past.33 Forty-two percent of those with German and Austro-Hungarian 
backgrounds were Canadian-born, and they represented only about 
thirteen percent of the total Canadian-born prairie population.34 In 
any case, sixty-three percent of the Saskatchewan male population 
aged eighteen to forty-five was either Canadian- or British-born, only 
ten percent less than the level in Manitoba (73.0) which had a much 
higher rate of enlistment (1911 Census of Canada, Table x ). It is 
unclear, then, the extent to which the level of German and/or Austro- 
Hungarian ancestry affected enlistment rates.
Enlistment rates were generally lower in provinces with large rural 
populations. There are two possible explanations. One is the reluctance 
of farmers to enlist, or to allow their sons to enlist, because they believed 
that increasing food production was a more important contribution to 
the war effort than they would provide by enlisting. That this was 
important is recognised by the fact that in 1917 they were originally 
exempted from conscription. The second is that the army provided an 
alternative to the urban jobs that had disappeared during the pre-war 
depression— leading to higher enlistment rates in urban areas.35
The argument that rural areas tended to produce fewer recruits, 
while it is true for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan, 
is not as relevant for Quebec. There was a common perception that 
Quebec was a primarily rural province. While 51.6 percent of its 
population did live in rural areas, this was only slightly more than 
the 47.4 percent in Ontario and considerably less than the percentages 
in Manitoba (56 percent), Saskatchewan (73.3) and Alberta (62.1).36 
The percent of Quebec’s population living in urban areas (48 percent) 
was second only to Ontario (52.6 percent) and above the Canadian 
average of 45.5 percent (Table i v ).
32 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 236.
33 Joseph Boudreau, “Western Canada’s ‘Enemy Aliens’ in World War One,” 
Alberta Historical Review 12, no. 1 (1964).
34 Canada Year Book 1918, 106.
35 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1914: A Nation Transformed 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 262.1
36 Census of Canada 1911, vol. I, Table X, 530.
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Between 1871 and 1914 the Census defined an ”urban place” 
as any incorporated community, regardless of size. Since then, a 
population threshold of 1,000 has been applied. Table v  is based on 
that definition. Table v i  indicates that neither the level of urbanisation 
in 1911 nor the increase in urbanisation between 1901 and 1911 was 
significantly correlated with enlistment rates. The correlations do 
suggest that Canadian-born males were less likely to live in more 
urbanised provinces, and for the opposite to be the case for British- 
born men (Table v ). The significant negative correlation between 
the increase in urban population between 1901 and 1911 and the 
proportion of Canadian-born eligible males is interesting, as is the 
positive correlation with the proportion of British-born males. This 
suggests that the rapid urban growth over this decade, which was 
most noticeable in the Prairie provinces, was the result of either 
immigration or inter-provincial migration.
Difficult economic conditions also influenced rates of enlistment. 
The initial rush of volunteers was partly a response to high levels of 
unemployment among waged labour in the industrial heartland. By 
the summer of 1915, concern over unemployment was so serious that 
the government began to discuss the feasibility of sending unemployed 
munitions workers to Britain where jobs were available.37 Drought in the 
Prairies reduced farm income in 1914 at a time when railway construction 
had slowed to a crawl.38 Then the outbreak of war led to an immediate 
cutback in public works spending by all levels of government, causing 
severe unemployment in the urban construction industry.
The war brought few economic benefits to Canada. It has been 
argued that the country would have been richer in both the long and 
short term if the war had not happened.39 The Shell Committee, and 
then its successor, the Imperial Munitions Board (i m b ), let significant 
contracts for the production of ships and munitions, but the benefits 
were understandably concentrated in areas of the country that already 
had the necessary manufacturing capability. The i m b  let munitions 
and ship-building contracts worth $1,104 million to a total of 718 
firms. There was a huge range in the size of the individual contracts,
37 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 34.
38 John Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West 1914-1918 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1978).
39 Michael Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Ties of Sir Joseph 
Flavelle, Bart., 1888-1939 (Toronto: MacMillan, 1978), 318.
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but fifty-nine percent of the firms which got contracts were in Ontario 
and twenty-five percent in Quebec. In terms of the total value of 
contracts, Ontario received forty-six percent and Quebec, twenty- 
nine percent. In the Prairie provinces only twenty-nine firms received 
contracts worth about $7 million, less than one percent of the total.40 
The fact that some regions enjoyed new wartime employment to help 
offset the effects of the pre-war depression, and others did not, may 
well have had a negative influence on rates of enlistment. Increasing 
demands for industrial workers, and the concomitant rise of wages led 
to increasing competition for labour. The conflict between military 
manpower policy and industrial policy surfaced as early as the spring 
of 1916.41
Canadian enlistment rates can be considered:
a general index of attitudes: of the degree of commitment of some 
regions to the war, and of others’ relative indifference or hostility. The 
statistics of response to the greatest international crisis Canada had 
ever confronted seem also to have some general significance as reflecting 
the isolationist predilections of some regions, and the existence in others 
of important ties of mind and hear with parts of the outside world. 
The dominating feature is, of course, the low figures for the province of 
Quebec which document most dramatically the traditional isolationism 
of French Canada.42
Was the war in Europe greatest international crisis Canada had 
ever faced? The different possible answers to this question may help 
to explain the undoubtedly low enlistment rate in Quebec (Table 
v i ). The complaint that Quebec did not ‘do its share’ in terms of 
contributing men to the c e f  was made as early as 1916 and has 
remained a contentious issue ever since. Efforts have been made to 
explain and justify the situation, but it remains unresolved and the 
history of the period continues to challenge comfortable assumptions,
40 F.C. Hirsch, “Statement of Orders Placed by the Imperial Munitions Board in 
Canada, as to Provinces, also the United States,” 25 January 1919; “List of Firms 
From Whom the Imperial Munitions Board Purchased Materials,” 21 February 1919, 
F.C. Hirsch Papers, Library and Archives Canada, MG 30, B4: Vol. 36.
41 Brown and Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith,” 66.
42 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 236.
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as it should in a mature country.43 It was a sensitive issue for Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier who predicted in January 1917 that:
If it be said that Quebec did not come forward in the same number as 
the English provinces, I have reason to believe than when the figures are 
analyzed, the margin of difference between the native-born populations 
of Quebec and the native-born population of the other provinces will 
not be very wide.44
Others have since argued that if British immigrants are removed 
from the calculations, the respective contribution of French- and 
English-Canadians were more proportional than the raw data 
suggest.45 Unfortunately any attempt to prove the point is made 
impossible by the lack of disaggregated data giving the specific place 
of birth of the eligible, Canadian-born population. However, one 
document in the Public Archives of Canada which shows place-of- 
birth data leads to the conclusion that while twenty-three percent 
of c e f  enlistments took place in Quebec, only eleven percent were 
Quebec-born. On the other hand, the province had 24.5 percent of 
the country’s eligible male population (Table v i ) and twenty-one 
percent of the Canadian-born members of the c e f  enlisted there 
(Table i i i ). From one perspective then, men living in Quebec enlisted 
in the c e f  in almost the same proportion they made up of the pool of 
eligible men. But Ontario, with thirty-five percent of the eligible men, 
provided forty-eight percent of the Canadian-born recruits.
Given the long-lasting debate about the adequacy of Quebec’s, or 
French-Canada’s contribution to the c e f , it is unfortunate that the 
Attestation Paper did not record the mother tongue of recruits.46 The 
table in the official history of the c e f  showing the language of men 
in the First Contingent is of dubious quality since a footnote explains 
that “French Canadians are credited with the full strength of French- 
Canadian units, and all men bearing French names and born in
43 MacMillan, The Uses and Abuses of History, 75.
44 Quoted in Terry Copp, The Canadian Response to War: 1914-1917 (Toronto: 
Copp Clark, 1971), 39.
45 Serge Durflinger, “French Canada and Recruitment during the First World War,” 
(1998) available at warmuseum.ca/education/on-educational-resources/dispatches/ 
French-canada-and-recruitment-during-the-first-world-war/
46 Whether this was a deliberate move by Hughes is matter of conjecture. See 
Haycock, Sam Hughes, 213.
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Canada are called French-Canadians.”47 The first criterion would 
count bilingual Anglophones or other non-Francophones assigned to 
one of the nominally French-Canadian battalions, and the second 
would ignore men whose families might have an English surname 
because of a long-ago ancestor but which had been francophone for 
generations. Militia Department statistics indicate that by 30 April, 
14,100 French-speaking soldiers had enlisted, although less than half 
were recruited in Quebec.48 The origin of these statistics is unknown.
The debate is also complicated by the fact that most sources do 
not differentiate between Quebec and French Canada. Then, as now, 
there were pockets of francophone Canadians outside the boundaries 
of Quebec. One was the Donnelly-Falher region of the Peace River 
district in northern Alberta which attracted a number of young men 
from Quebec when it was opened for settlement just prior to the war. 
Fifty-five young men from this area ended up in military service. 
Only one was Anglophone. Seven were of French origin. Five of them 
went home to join the French Army, the others joined the c e f . Two 
men joined the American Army. The Anglophone man and seven 
others were volunteers. The remaining forty-two were conscripted and 
two of them were killed. Most of these men were Quebec-born, and 
were presumably recorded as such during attestation. However, since 
most sources consider the place of enlistment, rather than the place of 
birth, the entry of these men into the c e f  inflated the Alberta total, 
reduced the Quebec one, and contributed no information about the 
number of Francophones in the c e f . But we know this only because 
the author of a rarely-cited article came from this region.49 A similar 
situation may have occurred in New Brunswick where five of the 
seven battalions raised contained large numbers of Acadian recruits.50 
It is impossible to guess how many times a similar situation occurred 
in other regions of the country, but it has been argued that French- 
Canadians outside Quebec enlisted in about the same proportion as 
their English-speaking confreres.51
47 Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, appendix 86.
48 J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Canada and the Two World Wars 
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), 25.
49 Jean Pariseau, “La participation des Canadiens frangais a l’effort des deux 
guerres mondiales: demarche de reinterpretion,” Canadian Defence Quarterly/Revue 
Canadienne de Defense 13, no. 2 (1983), 43-48.
50 Brown and Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith,” 71, footnote 36.
51 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 212.
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On 30 April 1917 the Minister of Militia, Sir Edward Kemp, 
told the House of Commons that 14,100 French-Canadian men had 
proceeded overseas. He was asked how the government determined 
this number and whether if had taken into consideration that some 
men with English or Scottish surnames were actually French­
speaking? Kemp did not reply.52 In a statement to the House of 
Commons on March 1918 the prime minister said there were 16,268 
Canadians of French descent in the army but provided no source 
for the number.53 In an oft-quoted letter written on 30 December 
1935, the deputy minister of national defence said “there is not, nor 
ever can be, any precise, accurate or authentic statement as to the 
number of French Canadians who served in the Canadian forces in 
the World War 1914-1919.”54 However Armstrong, quoting Canadian 
sources within British headquarters, estimated that approximately 
15,000 French-Canadians served in France, about 10,000 of them 
in combatant battalions.55 And, in an appendix based on Kemp’s 
statement, she estimated the total number of French-Canadians 
in the c e f  at between 32,000 and 35,000, which would represent 
roughly six percent of its total strength. Pariseau suggests “if the 
French-Canadians provided only 12.6 percent of the total effectives, 
that would become 24.5 percent if applied only to the Canadian-born 
troops,” which he says numbered 318,705.56 This hypothesis would 
suggest about 78,000 French-speaking recruits, a number which 
has not been suggested elsewhere. An article in La Presse on 14 
December 1916 suggested that 42,000 of the 150,000 men who had 
enlisted in Ontario were native-born. If true, then the comparable 
number from Quebec would be about 25,000. Another author argues, 
without evidence, that “if our good neighbours in Ontario enlisted 
above all in auxiliary and rear-echelon units, this is exactly the 
opposite of the case of the French-Canadians ... who enlisted above
52 Debates of the House of Commons, 1917, 2627.
53 Debates of the House of Commons, 1918, 936.
54 Quoted in Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec 1914-1918 (New York 
Columbia University Press, 1937), 39.
55 Ibid., 249.
56 Pariseau, “La participation des Canadiens frangais a l’effort des deux guerres 
mondiales,” 45.
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all as combatants.”57 None of these attempts to redress the balance 
are supported by statistics.
Marriage also affected enlistment. While the values are not 
statistically significant, the correlations between the percentage of 
eligible men who were married and both voluntary and total enlistment 
rates are negative (Table v ). Marriage rates were higher among 
young French-Canadian men than those living elsewhere (Table v i i ). 
Sixty percent of the men aged twenty to forty-five in Quebec were 
married; the highest level in Canada. When five-year age groups 
are considered, Quebec had the highest proportion of married men 
in every group but one. Twenty-one percent of the British Columbia 
men aged twenty to twenty-four were married, slightly more than the 
20.1 percent in Quebec. This factor cannot be ignored, at least in the 
early days of the war. The infamous mobilisation telegram sent on 14 
August 1914 by Hughes to all officers commanding militia divisions 
and districts stipulated that ‘no married man will be authorised to 
proceed to Valcartier without the written consent of his wife.’ This 
requirement remained in place until 13 August 1915.58
Is it necessary to try and argue that the contribution of French- 
Canadians was comparable to the level recorded in other parts of 
the country given that married and employed men were also under­
represented? A better question might be: how many ‘Quebecers’ 
would have had to enlist to make the controversy go away? If the 
answer is: enough to have made conscription unnecessary, this would 
place on Quebec the entire onus of a problem that was pervasive 
across the country— the declining success of voluntary enlistment 
from 1917 onwards.
Morton argues that men with deep ancestral roots in Canada 
were the least likely to enlist.59 Not all Canadians viewed their 
European heritage— assuming they had one— in the same way. Many 
Francophones had a concept of Canada quite different from their 
Anglophone neighbours. Ignoring this ignores the importance of some
57 Jacques Michel, La Participation des Canadians Francais a la Grande Guerre. 
Reponse a un livre recent de M. Andre Siegfried: ‘Le Canada, puissance internationale ’ 
(Montreal: Editions de L ’A.C.-F., 1938), 21.
58 Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 26.
59 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada from Champlain to the Gulf 
War, Third Edn. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 152.
18
Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 23
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss1/23
S H A R P E  35
issues that were considered vitally important by French Canada but 
easily dismissed by English-speaking Canadians.60
While people might have been prepared to accept that every step 
in the crisis that led to the outbreak of war was a logical response to 
the one before in orthodox military and diplomatic terms, they did 
not necessarily accept this as a good reason for eight million people 
to die.61 Armstrong argued that understanding the Quebec response 
to the war requires distinguishing between two kinds of nationalism: 
active and passive. The latter refers to a people prepared to defend their 
country only when it was actually threatened. The war demonstrated 
that there were two widely-held conceptions of the country: one that 
believed Canada should help shape Europe’s destiny and the other 
convinced that as a small North American nation she should cope 
with her own internal problems.62 Unfortunately the difference of 
opinion, and the responses it generated, led to the situation where, 
for the first time since Confederation, many Francophones came to 
view Quebec as their only true political homeland.
Understanding the French-Canadian response also requires 
an appreciation of the importance of the relationship between 
language and schooling. Many critics, Armstrong in particular, fail 
to give to the Ontario school question the importance it deserves 
although “no incident did more to colour the attitudes of Quebec 
and Ontario towards one another than the struggle over Regulation 
x v i i , formulated by the Ontario Department of Education in 1912.”63 *
During the late nineteenth century there was a significant spill-over of 
people from Quebec into eastern and northern Ontario, and by 1910, 
Franco-Ontarians constituted about ten percent of the provincial 
population. Regulation x v i i  effectively prohibited the use of French 
as a language of instruction beyond the first two years of school and 
was widely interpreted as yet another facet of an ongoing campaign 
led by two normally irreconcilable groups. Irish settlers in general,
60 Carl Berger, “Introduction,” in Ramsay Cook, Craig Brown, and Carl Berger, 
eds., Conscription 1917 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), vii-x.
61 Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen, The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the 
Empire, Volume I  (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 208.
62 Joseph Levitt, “Introduction to the Carleton Library Edition,” in The Crisis of 
Quebec 1914-1918, by Elizabeth H. Armstrong, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1974), xi.
63 Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question (Toronto: MacMillan,
0 66h 3 5 .
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and Ontario Orangemen in particular were united in their opposition 
to Franco-Ontarians: the Orangemen because they were Catholics, 
the Irish because they spoke French. They knew it was impossible 
to force adults to forget their native language, but wanted to ensure 
that children were prevented from learning it. The restriction on the 
teaching of French was particularly offensive because there was no 
equivalent restriction on German, which was a language of instruction 
in a number of schools in and around Pembroke and Kitchener. When 
the Ontario regulation is considered alongside the restrictions on 
French-language instruction imposed in the new provinces of Alberta 
and Saskatchewan in 1905, and the long-standing debate about 
French-language education in Manitoba, which ended in its abolition 
in 1916, it is easy to understand how francophone Canadians would 
feel that ‘the tyranny of the democratic majority’ had emphasised 
individual over group rights.64 It confirmed their long-standing belief 
that only in Quebec did people believe that Canada was a partnership 
between two ‘founding’ peoples, the French and the English.65 For 
many French-Canadians, this national-scale issue became a principal 
preoccupation. They saw that the first line of defence of what they 
considered inalienable rights was not in Flanders, but in the schools of 
Ontario, and French-Canadian nationalists were convinced that this 
was just the most recent episode in a 250 year humiliation of the 
innocent, benevolent and tolerant French-Canadian at the hands of the 
villainous English.66 It is particularly unfortunate that the dispute was 
at its most bitter in 1916, during one of the most crucial stages of the 
war, and it undoubtedly affected the debate over conscription in 1917.67
Many British-born men enlisted in the c e f . Whether this 
was to defend Great Britain, the empire, or Canada is irrelevant. 
Why was a similar commitment to a ‘mother country’ not felt by 
Canadian Francophones? French-Canadians had no reason to feel 
an attachment to Britain, which even after a century-and-a-half, was 
still considered the conqueror. There was no longer a need to rely 
on Britain for defence against the Americans, so loyalty to Britain 
could easily be considered a one-sided obligation. But what about
64 Ibid., 41.
65 Levitt, “Introduction,” xviii.
66 Gerard Filteau, Le Quebec, le Canada et la Guerre 1914-1918 (Montreal: Les 
Editions de L ’Aurore), 1977, 21. MacMillan, The Uses and Abuses of History, 71.
67 Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question, 37.
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France, which was more gravely affected by the war than Britain? 
The answer may be that there was no sentimental tie to France 
strong enough to warrant dying for her.68 More than a century of 
neglect and separation had broken any remaining bonds of intimacy.69 
For many French-Canadians, their mother country was Canada, not 
Britain or France.70
Finally, it should be remembered that in 1914 the c e f  was an 
English-speaking institution. All the instruction manuals were in 
English and most officers, including those of the 22nd, were English­
speaking. Only unilingual Francophones were accepted into the 
battalions earmarked for Canadiens; bilingual Francophones were 
generally assigned to English-speaking battalions.71 At a time when 
many in Quebec were unilingual, this posed an insurmountable 
problem. At the beginning of the war, Perley suggested to the prime 
minister that a French-Canadian battalion be raised as a matter of 
priority since he “personally doubted the wisdom of doing anything 
to accentuate different races as all are Canadian.”72 Not everyone 
was as perceptive. Hughes most certainly was not. Among the 36,000
68 Dyer and Viljoen, The Defence of Canada, 252.
69 Filteau, Le Quebec, le Canada et la Guerre 1914-1918, 20.
70 Serge Durflinger, “Face to Face on Conscription,” Legion Magazine, Retrieved 
28 April 2014, available at Legionmagazine.com/en/2014/03/face-to-face-on- 
conscription. J. Castell Hopkins provides a sympathetically critical contemporary 
assessment of the situation: “The two million people of French origin in Quebec or 
scattered in other provinces of Canada looked upon their race as the pioneer settlers, 
as the founders of the nation, as the most devoted sons of the soil. They were much 
more detached from their old-time Motherland than were English, Scotch or Irish 
Canadians; no common ties of language, education and religious sympathy held 
them to Canadian national unity. They were detached from the other provinces 
of Canada ... by a different language and, upon the whole, a different religion. ... 
It should often have been remembered that the French Canadian was isolated by 
his faith and language from the rest of Canada; that he was separated by various 
traditions and interpretations of history from the ideals of the English Canadian; 
that he was severed by a gulf from the anti-Church, republican, socialistic France of 
1914, no matter how devoted he might be to the French language and his records 
of French heroism; that he did not understand, and few of his leaders had faithfully 
interpreted to him, the Empire ideals of other provinces; that, practically, he knew 
no country but Canada as embodied in his native province and often was frankly 
indifferent to the fate of other nations or indeed provinces.” J.C. Hopkins, Canada 
at War: A Record of Heroism and Achievement (Toronto: Canadian Annual Review 
Limited, 1919), 267-269.
71 Filteau, Le Quebec, le Canada et la Guerre 1914-1918, 73.
72 Quoted in Desmond Morton, “French Canada and War, 1868-1917: The Military 
Background to the Conscription Crisis of 1917,” 84-103, in J.L. Granatstein and R.D. 
Cuff, eds., War and Society in North America (Toronto: Thomas Nelson, 1971), 84.
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men who came to Valcartier, 1,245 claimed to be of French origin 
— slightly over half of them already members of French-speaking 
militia units. While this would have been just enough men to form 
a complete battalion, this first, critical opportunity was forsaken 
— perhaps not surprisingly given that Hughes was a dedicated 
Orangeman who would hardly have cared that, for the first time in 
the country’s history, a military force was being organised without 
adequate French-Canadian representation. So the French-Canadian 
militiamen of the Carabiniers Mont-Royal, the Chasseurs Canadiens, 
the Voltigeurs de Quebec and the Carabiniers de Sherbrooke were 
allocated to two English-speaking battalions; the 12th, along with 
men from New Brunswick and p e i  and the 14th, along with men 
from two Anglophone units from Montreal.73 By the time the First 
Canadian Division had completed its training in England and was 
ready to move to the front line, French-Canadian representation was 
limited to a single company of the 14th battalion, one forty-eighth of 
the division’s infantry.74
A later suggestion that a four-battalion French-Canadian brigade 
be created was also ignored. Twelve French-language battalions were 
authorised during the war; four percent of the 275 battalions raised 
for overseas service. They can be identified by their cap badges 
which bear the words ‘Battalion Canadien-Frangais d’Outre-Mer’. 
Ten were raised in Quebec (although one also recruited in Ottawa), 
one in eastern Ontario (230th Voltigeurs Canadien-Frangais), and 
one in Western Canada (233ieme Nord-Ouest).75 Only one, the 
22nd, recruited to strength and fought as a unit. All the others were 
broken up to provide reinforcements, primarily for the 22nd, but also 
for Anglophone units.76 By the summer of 1916 one Francophone 
battalion was in France, two in England, one training in Nova Scotia, 
one on garrison duty in Bermuda, and one in Quebec City, providing 
reinforcements for overseas. The rest were at Valcartier, characterised
73 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 213.
74 Morton, “French Canada and War,” 96.
75 John F. Meek, Over the Top! The Canadian Infantry in the First World War 
(Stittsville, Ontario: Private Printing, 1971). Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, 
French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces, Volume I, 1763­
1969: The Fear of a Parallel Army (Ottawa: Directorate of History, Department of 
National Defence, 1988), 79.
76 Pierre Vennat, Les ‘Poilus’ Quebecois de 1914-1918: Histoire des militaires 
canadiens-frangais de la Premiere Guerre mondiale (Boucherville: Meridien, 1999), 12.
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as barely existing as military units, undisciplined, weak in numbers 
and plagued by bad officers and desertion.77
In his 1919 report to Parliament the director of the Military 
Service Act laid the blame for the below-average commitment of 
Quebec’s young men at the feet of the province’s teachers and leaders:
In justice to the average citizen of Quebec it is only fair to point out 
that all the evidence which has reached this Branch, including many 
police reports and results of investigations, have shown conclusively that 
whatever defiance to the law has been encountered in that province 
was caused, not so much by any premeditated and well-thought-out 
intent to default on the part of the common people, as by the evil 
teachings or influences to which they were unfortunately subject. It is 
inconceivable that a people of such splendid personal morality as the 
French-Canadians should fail to take proper issue when a question of 
international morality was gripping the entire world, if the campaign of 
education as to the real issues of the war had been generally supported 
by the educated or popular leaders of that province.78
T H E  F A I L U R E  O F  V O L U N T A R Y  E N L I S T M E N T  A N D  C O N S C R I P T I O N
By August 1916, all forty-eight battalions of the first four divisions 
of the Canadian Corps were in France. To this point voluntary 
recruitment had provided sufficient reserves to maintain the strength 
of the corps. Then the successful attack against Vimy Ridge on 
Easter Sunday 1917 exposed the weakness of the recruiting system 
and confirmed the validity of the concerns expressed two years 
earlier by Gwatkin, Perley and Fiset. Taking the ridge cost the corps 
10,602 casualties in less than a week. Total casualties for the month 
amounted to 23,939, but only 4,761 men volunteered. The flow of 
new recruits had now slackened to the point that it was impossible
77 Morton, “French Canada and War,” 100.
78 Report of the Director on the Operation of the Military Service Act (1919), 
Sessional paper 246, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1919).
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Figure 1 1 : Male Enlistments and Appointments, and Casualties 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, August 1 9 1 4 -May 1 9 2 0
to provide sufficient reinforcements (Figure i i ).79 The enlistment rate 
in the spring of 1917 was so low that it would take four months to 
replace one normal month’s losses.80 Keeping the corps at its current 
strength would require 75,000 new recruits per year.
The c e f  as a whole was not short of men. There were still 
about 10,000 men in England and another 60,000 in Canada. The 
government had decided in the fall of 1915 that in addition to the 
approximately 12,000 men of the militia who were on active service,
50,000 men of the c e f  were to be kept in Canada for training 
and home defence duties.81 However the plans for 1919, which was
79 The enlistment data in this table are based on Appendix C of Nicholson (1962: 
546). They correct what must be a typographical error in Nicholson’s table, which 
gives a total of 24,506 ‘other rank’ enlistments for October, 1918— an impossible 
number. Removing 20,000 from this number brings the total enlistments to 619,636, 
the generally-agreed number. This typographical error has, unfortunately, found its 
way into some subsequent work (e.g. Mainville, n.d., 21).
80 A.M. Willms, “Conscription 1917: A brief for the defence,” Canadian Historical 
Review XXXVII, no. 4, (1956), 432.
81 J.L. Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War,” in David MacKenzie, ed., 
Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, 63-75, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005),66.
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expected to be the year of the great final push, called for 120,000 
reinforcements over and above the current demand, and even putting 
all the attested men into action would have been insufficient to meet 
the need. The government faced some hard choices.
The prime minister’s position on compulsory service was well- 
known. In December 1914 he told an audience in Halifax that 
“under the laws of Canada, our citizens may be called out to defend 
our own territory, but cannot be required to go beyond the seas 
except for the defence of Canada itself. There has not been, there 
will not be, compulsion or conscription.”82 The minister of militia 
understood this too. During the special session of Parliament on 22 
August 1914, Hughes was asked whether, if additional Canadian 
troops were to be dispatched to the front, the system of volunteering 
would be continued. He replied: “so far as my own personal views are 
concerned, I am absolutely opposed to anything that is not voluntary 
in every sense, and I do not read in the law that I have any authority 
to ask Parliament to allow troops other than volunteers to leave the 
country.”83 Prime Minister Borden reiterated his position in the House 
of Commons in January 1916, saying: “in speaking in the first two or 
three months of this war I made it clear to the people of Canada that 
we do not propose conscription. I repeat that announcement today 
with emphasis.”84 He was undoubtedly sincere on both occasions. 
However, in the face of insufficient voluntary enlistment, he now 
faced three choices: reduce the size of each Canadian division by 
removing one brigade (i.e. four battalions); disband one or more of 
the four combat-hardened divisions and re-allocate the men to other 
units; or introduce selective conscription.
Currie refused to give in to British pressure to reduce the size of 
his divisions.85 The twelve-battalion, three-brigade Canadian division 
was considerably larger than the comparable British unit. When 
100 men were added to each battalion in early 1918, after the 5th 
Division was broken up and its 21,000 men sent to reinforce existing 
units, each of the four original divisions had 1,200 more men in the 
line than a British one, and all the Canadian units operated at full
82 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 35.
83 Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, appendix 58.
84 House of Commons Debates, 17 January 1916, 26.
85 Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: The Sensational Wars of Sam Hughes 
and General Arthur Currie (Toronto: Allen Lane Canada, 2010), 233.
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strength during the last months of the war. Because they could fight 
with two battalions up and two in reserve, follow-up attacks by a 
Canadian division had fifty percent more men than a British one, as 
well as more artillery, machine guns and engineers. All these factors 
contributed to the tremendous success enjoyed by the corps during 
The Hundred Days that ended the war.
Currie’s obstinate defense of the structure of the corps, and the 
fact that the option of reducing the overall size of the c e f  was never 
seriously considered by the government, reduced Borden’s choices 
from three to one. Convinced of the need for reinforcements to 
support the efforts of the men overseas, and buoyed by a groundswell 
of public support for conscription as a way of equalizing the sacrifice, 
the prime minister announced on 18 May 1917 that conscription 
would be imposed as permitted by the Militia Act.86 This decision 
was not without precedent. Australia had twice rejected conscription 
for overseas service in October 1916, but both New Zealand and 
Britain had imposed it, although it is interesting that Britain did not 
extend it to Ireland, where participation in an imperial war was as 
unpopular as it was in Quebec.
The Military Service Act (m s a ) was signed into law on 29 August 
1917. Twenty English-speaking members of the Liberal opposition 
deserted Laurier to vote for it; nine French-speaking Members 
of Parliament voted against. Only five francophone Members of 
Parliament voted for the bill: two cabinet ministers, one Member of 
Parliament from each of Saskatchewan and New Brunswick and the 
former deputy speaker of the House. The passage of this legislation 
has been characterised as one of the great tragedies of Canadian 
history because the Great War, which could have been for Canada 
what it was for other dominions, a powerful nation-building force 
but which was actually divisive in its effects upon the relations 
between English and French.87 War can be a shared experience which 
transforms a people into a nation, but Canada became a country of 
two nations. Which is why Robert Fulford argues that the Great 
War should be considered as “the unmaking of Canada as much
86 Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 573.
87 C.P. Stacey, “Nationality: The experience of Canada,” Canadian Historical 
Association Report 1967, (1967), 12.
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as the making.”88 To most Quebecers, conscription represented the 
ruthless determination of English-Canadians to order young French- 
Canadian men to die for an exclusively English-Canadian cause.89 To 
many in English-speaking Canada it was a way to wreak vengeance 
on Quebecers who, by their blunt opposition to conscription, had 
demonstrated that they were either disloyal, or cowards, or both.90
On 13 October 1917, all men of Class i (unmarried men or widowers 
aged twenty to twenty-four years) were ordered to report “for the 
defence and security of Canada, the preservation of our Empire and 
of human liberty.” The m s a  defined all male British subjects between 
the ages of eighteen and forty-five as eligible for military service, 
and stipulated that if and when a certain defined class of men was 
called up, all its members would immediately be considered soldiers. 
Prior to reporting they were deemed to have been on leave of absence 
without pay.91 Any man seeking exemption had to make a written 
appeal to the local tribunal. From a military point of view, the 
greatest weakness of the Act was the liberality and vagueness of the 
allowed exemptions. A man could be exempted if he had an essential 
occupation or if his work required special qualifications; if serious 
hardship would result from his absence on military service; if he was 
a conscientious objector, Mennonite, Doukhobor or clergyman; if he 
was an honourably discharged veteran; or suffered from an obvious 
physical disability. Section 11 (1) (d) was particularly generous: “that 
serious hardship would ensue, if the man were placed on active 
service, owing to his exceptional financial or business obligations, or 
domestic position.”92
Virtually all the Class i men (93.7 percent) immediately applied 
for an exemption from military service. While the requests came 
from all walks of life, and all parts of the country, perhaps the most 
resolute opposition came from rural Canada where it was feared that 
conscription would accelerate the trend to rural depopulation that 
had picked up speed since the war began— not only as a voluntary 
response to calls for enlistment in the c e f , but also because of the
88 Morton, “French Canada and War,” 85. Robert Fulford, “The Great War and the 
Unmaking of Canada,” National Post, 8 February 2000, B1.
89 Dyer and Viljoen, The Defence of Canada, 292.
90 Morton, “French Canada and War,” 102. Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian 
Question, 37.
91 Hopkins, Canada at War, 91.
92 Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 572.
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lure of increasingly well-paid jobs in the industrial cities.93 By the 
end of the year 404,395 men had reported but 380,510 had sought 
exemption, leaving only about 24,000 who were willing to serve from 
the outset. In Ontario, 118,000 of 125,000 sought exemption; in 
Quebec, 115,000 of 117,000. Most exemptions were granted. O f those 
seeking exemption, 278,779 were granted by the end of 1917. Another 
53,788 cases remained to be heard, and 67,122 appeals had been made 
against the initial tribunal decisions, many by military authorities.94 
Misconceptions, misinformation, and confusion contributed to the 
widespread animosity against the m s a  and Quebec. According to 
the central appeal judge (a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) 
there was a common belief in Quebec that Francophones were given 
blanket exemptions while conscription was imposed on Anglophones 
with “unparalled vigour.”95
There were many reasons for the almost universal filing of claims 
for exemption. The euphoria which greeted the outbreak of war less 
than three years previously had disappeared as the casualty lists 
lengthened, and the men still at home began to realise just how 
awful the war really was. It was different than any war in which 
Canadians had previously fought. It was the first war in which more 
soldiers perished by enemy fire than by disease because of the hugely 
increased exposure of soldiers to acute danger.96 Except in very 
specific circumstances such as siege warfare, soldiers had rarely been 
placed in life-threatening situations for prolonged periods. But the 
long range and enhanced lethality of First World War artillery, the 
development of new weapons, especially the machine gun, combined 
with the static deadlock of trench warfare, meant that soldiers had to 
cope with high levels of stress and danger for long periods of time.97 
Nor was it lost on the men remaining in Canada that recruits were 
desperately being sought just when they were most likely to be killed.98
The goal of the m s a , to enlist 100,000 young, unmarried men, 
was eventually achieved (Table v i i i ). The final report of the director
93 W.R. Young, “Conscription, rural depopulation and the farmers of Ontario,” 
Canadian Historical Review 53, (1972).
94 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 85-87.
95 Granatstein and Morton, Canada and the Two World Wars, 119.
96 Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, ii
97 Gary Sheffield, The First World War in 100 Objects: The story of the Great War 
told through the objects that shaped it (London: Sevenoaks, 2013), 46.
98 Mainville, “Committing to War,” 10.
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Edmonton’s recruiting scene ca. 1914-15. [Library and Archives Canada PA 0 1 3 0 7 1 ]
of the Military Service Branch indicated that 113,461 men were made 
available to the military authorities although a return to Parliament 
by the Militia Department in 1919 revealed that 124,588 men had 
been ‘taken on strength’ (Table v i i i ). Subtracting the 24,933 on 
leave for compassionate or farming-related duties, and subsequently 
discharged, and 16,300 struck off strength as liable only for non­
combat duties “or of a category that ought not to have been order to 
report” leaving 83,355 men actually enlisted. This number has since 
been accepted as accurate although it understates the number of men 
made available.99
The inconclusive debate about the wisdom of, necessity for, and 
practical consequences of conscription has been going on since 1917. 
For many years there was a general consensus that conscription was 
a pointless tragedy because it split the country, destroyed the unity of 
both the Conservative and Liberal parties, and did not provide enough 
additional men to have any significant effect on the outcome of the 
war.100 But almost a quarter-century later, one of the authors of the 
standard work on Canadian conscription had an epiphany when he 
came to understand the fundamental fact that men in understrength
99 C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A survey of defense policies and 
strategic conditions past and present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), 79.
100 Berger, “Introduction,” viii; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 99.
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units were at much greater risk than those in full-strength ones.101 
The basic tactical unit was the battalion, with a nominal strength of 
approximately 1,000 men. It could lose much of that strength in the 
course of an afternoon. For example, in the three days between 15 and 
18 September 1916, the 22nd Battalion lost a third of its men in the 
battle for Courcelette. Two weeks later it lost another third at Regina 
Trench. Even if casualties on this scale could be replaced, and this 
was exceptionally difficult in the case of a French-Canadian battalion, 
it would almost certainly be with inexperienced men whose initial 
contribution to the fighting capabilities of the unit would be minimal.
A  reduction in firepower dramatically increases the stress on 
the remaining effectives, especially since understrength battalions 
were all-too-often assigned the same tasks as full-strength ones. 
Thus the need for reinforcements was based on much more than a 
nebulous feeling that Canada had to ‘do its bit’. As noted previously, 
enlistments were running at about 4,000 per month in the spring 
of 1917. Not all of those who enlisted were interested in serving in 
the infantry and furthermore, getting new recruits to France was 
becoming increasingly difficult as the entry of the United States into 
the war put huge strains on an already inadequate supply of shipping. 
No Allied leader, political or military, could have predicted that 1918 
would be “the year of unexpected victory.”102 Nor could they have 
imagined the scale of the casualties that Canadian forces would 
suffer during the last few months of the war. During the ‘Hundred 
Days’ between the opening of the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 
and the Armistice, the corps suffered 45,835 casualties, the highest 
Canadian casualty rate in its history.103 This amounted to nearly 
twenty percent of the total number of c e f  casualties during the entire 
war. Conscripts provided the great bulk of the corps’ reinforcements 
during this critical period. The 24,132 men who reached the front 
lines by the time of the Armistice provided more reinforcements than 
the 5th Division did when it was broken up— and they arrived just in 
time to let the corps achieve its greatest successes of the war. Had the 
war continued into 1919, as everybody expected, the conscripts would 
have been sufficient to keep the corps up to strength for most of the year.
101 Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War.”
102 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 217.
103 Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 5.
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Their presence in the line, no matter how poorly-trained they may have 
been, undoubtedly helped to reduce the overall number of casualties.
W H E R E  W E R E  A L L  T H E  ‘ R E A L ’  C A N A D I A N S ?
The largest army raised in Canada prior to 1914 contained less than
10,000 men. In spite of the daunting organisational and logistic 
challenges, and the lack of a precedent, this “unmilitary country” 
was able to raise an expeditionary force of almost 620,000 men and 
women.104 It is ironic that this force, which stood firm in the face 
of the world’s first poison gas attack at Ypres in 1915, which was 
responsible for the iconic victory at Vimy Ridge in 1917, and which 
played a leading rule during the last hundred days of the war, should 
be characterised as a national failure because not enough native-born 
Canadians joined its ranks. Given the contemporary preoccupation 
with this issue, it is not surprising that “an entire literature has 
been devoted to denying, justifying, or explaining the reluctance of 
the Canadian-born to enlist for overseas service.”105 There is never 
a single, simple explanation for any national-scale phenomenon, but 
it has been suggested that the nature of pre-war Canadian military 
culture may be part of it. The generation born and raised in Canada 
prior to 1914 generally accepted the idea of military service to 
defend the homeland. But it would have required a personal stake 
in the outcome of a European conflict before they would consider it 
a war worth dying in and there were many who, quite legitimately, 
couldn’t make the connection between a war on the French-German- 
Belgian border and the security of Canada.
By the time the First Contingent sailed from Quebec in October 
1914, questions were already being raised about what was perceived 
to be the small number of Canadian-born men in it. This seems 
a strange concern, given that all non-aboriginal people in Canada 
were either immigrants, or the children of immigrants. The critics 
also failed to make any distinction between recently-arrived, British- 
born immigrants, and those who had been brought to Canada as 
children. However the fact that a volunteer’s place of birth was
104 George F.G. Stanley, Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary 
People (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974).
105 Wood, Militia Myths, 223.
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considered important from the very beginning of the war indicates 
that Canadians believed that the distinction mattered. As the war 
dragged on, service at the front was increasingly viewed as a sacred 
duty by a large segment of the Canadian population, especially by 
non-combatants. But this conviction was not universally shared. For 
the significant minority who were unmoved by the clarion call of 
nationalism and patriotic duty— farmers and industrial workers, both 
English- and French-speaking— home defence might well be a duty of 
citizenship but overseas service was a matter of conscience. To them, 
the imposition of conscription for overseas service was a betrayal of 
the long-standing Canadian principle that the militia could be made 
subject to a levee en masse only for home defence.106 The m s a  ignored 
this long-standing tradition. Matters were made worse on 19 April 
1918 when all exemptions were cancelled and the draft age lowered 
from twenty to nineteen. The groups whose disaffection from national 
life would become a defining national characteristic— the farmers, 
workers, French Canadians, the Prairie West and Maritimers— were 
all united in their outrage over these decisions.
The perceived failure of the Canadian-born to ‘do their duty’ may 
be rooted in a conflation of the myths of the ‘citizen-soldier’ and the 
alleged superiority of the rugged Canadian lumberjack, farmer, or 
fisherman over the effete subjects of autocratic militaristic European 
nations. Canadian imperialists were fond of emphasizing the northern 
qualities of the country, and arguing that a rough and demanding 
climate produced a people characterised by energy, strength, self­
reliance, health, and purity.107 Lathe operators and office workers may 
have been vital to the nation’s economic survival, but they could
106 Ibid., 212.
107 Keshen, “The Great War Soldiers as nation-Builders in Canada and Australia,” 
4-8. Keshen notes that a similar mythology was created in Australia. The prototype 
there was the bushman or digger (i.e. miner or prospector) with roots in the 
Outback, who was tough, taciturn, and capable of improvisation as well as loyal 
to his mates. They could, consequently, be described to the Australian public as 
“physically powerful, exceptionally brave, independent-minded, and democratically- 
inclined.” As in Canada, however, this was not the background of most Australian 
males in general, or soldiers in particular. The unromantic fact was that most had 
experienced an urban or suburban upbringing and were in no way connected to the 
outback. However, eighty-two percent of them were Australian-born. Morton, When 
Your Number’s Up, 314. Morton quotes Jane Ross, The Myth of the Digger: The 
Australian Soldier in Two World Wars (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1985).
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hardly serve as national icons.108 The British readily seized the image 
of Canadians as robust, free-spirited pioneers notwithstanding that 
the inspiring image of the rugged Canadian as the backbone of the 
country’s army had no basis in fact.109
Of the men who fought at Vimy, 6.5 percent were farmers or 
ranchers, 18.5 percent were clerical workers, and 64.8 percent were 
manual workers. By war’s end, with the help of the m s a , farmers, 
fishermen, hunters, and lumbermen comprised 22.4 percent of the 
c e f , industrial workers 36.4 percent. Morton notes that even the 
white collar workers (126,387) outnumbered the 123,060 farmers, but 
this is misleading and unfair since he has included 15,023 students in 
the former number.110
More than sixty percent of the men in the First Contingent were 
British-born (Table x ). Less than one third of the ‘other ranks’ were 
Canadian-born, although just over seventy percent of the officers 
were.111 One explanation offered at the time was that the officers 
responsible for selecting this first group would have been foolish not 
to select volunteers with prior experience, and a substantial number of 
them would have been former British servicemen. Another, specifically 
addressed to the question of why eight of the first seventeen battalions 
were from Western Canada, is that the high levels of enlistment 
among young British-born men was not solely the result of their 
fervent loyalty. It also reflected that many of them had gone west 
to seek their fortune but hadn’t found it because of the economic 
depression of the pre-war years. As in most wars, enlistment offered 
an escape from hunger and disappointment.112
We must also remember that the Canada of 1914 was still a very 
young country. When Canada was created on 1 July 1867 it comprised 
only four provinces: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario. 
The southern portion of Manitoba was added in 1870, British Columbia 
in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873, Alberta and Saskatchewan in 
1905 and the northern part of Manitoba in 1912. So, men born in what 
was to become Canada could have been of any age, but the oldest male
108 Jonathan F. Vance, “Provincial patterns of enlistment in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Military History 17 (2008), 161.
109 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 278.
110 Ibid., 278.
111 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 24.
112 Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada’s Overseas Ministry in 
the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 21.
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born in the country of Canada would have been forty-seven years old 
in 1914 and a native of one of the four oldest provinces. Nobody born in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, or northern Manitoba after they became part of 
Canada would have been more than nine years old.
In 1911, 64.5 percent of the men aged eighteen to forty-five were 
native-born and eligible to serve (Table i). However, British-born men 
made the greatest proportional contribution to the c e f . Of the roughly
300,000 men born in Great Britain and her possessions, seventy- 
two percent volunteered their services, and sixty-three percent were 
posted overseas. The comparable figures for the Canadian-born 
eligible male population were twenty percent and eighteen percent 
(Table x i ). The imbalance is demonstrated by the significant positive 
correlation between the proportion of the eligible male population 
that was British-born and both voluntary and total enlistment, and 
the negative correlations between enlistment and the proportion of 
the eligible population that was Canadian-born (Table v i ).
By the time of the Armistice, the m s a  had redressed the balance 
in favour of the Canadian-born (Table i x ). Just over half of the 
total enlistments in the c e f  were Canadians. They also made up the 
largest national group of c e f  volunteers and the c e f  Overseas (Table 
x ) although their proportional representation in the overseas force 
was overshadowed by the British-, and particularly the Scottish-born 
(Table x i i ). However, the myth persists that Canadian-born men 
were willing to let others fight for them.
C O N C L U S I O N
Most of the men who flocked to the newly-built armouries to 
enlist in 1914, and those who followed were neither militiamen nor 
Canadians.113 A century on, this hardly matters. The men and women 
who participated in their various ways in the First World War were 
not concerned with how later generations would perceive them. They 
could no more foresee the future than we can. They made critical 
decisions in the midst of confusion and uncertainty based on the best 
information available at the time and their own personal assessments 
of what mattered most.114 Their actions cannot be viewed through
113 Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 31.
114 Copp, “The Military Effort, 1914-1918,” 35.
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the lens of a world removed from their daily reality by a full century. 
During the war Canadians, “as an immigrant people, wisely put more 
stock in commitment than birthplace.”115 There is no shame in the fact 
that the c e f , one of the country’s first great national institutions, was 
dominated by the foreign-born. Wherever they were born, whatever 
their reasons for enlistment might have been, all the men and women 
in the c e f  wore Canadian insignia and the headstones of those who 
died bear a maple leaf. Whatever they may have been before they 
joined the c e f , they were Canadians ever after, and their service and 
sacrifice is inextricably woven into the historical fabric of the country. 
Their commitment helped Canada come of age and, for the first time, 
stand proudly on the world stage in its own right.116
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A P P E N D I X
Table i: Percentage Distribution, b y  Province, o f  the M ale Population A ged  
18-45 Years o f  Age, b y  Place o f Birth, 1911
Province Canadian British Foreign
Prince Edward Island 98.4 0.9 0.7
Nova Scotia 87.2 8.6 4.2
New Brunswick 93.4 3.5 3.4
Quebec 87.4 5.9 6.7
Ontario 70.6 18.4 11.1
Manitoba 40.6 32.4 27
Saskatchewan 38.5 24.5 37
Alberta 30.5 26 43.5
British Columbia 26.2 34.6 39.2
Canada 64.5 17.8 17.7
Source: Canada Year Book 1918, Table 11
Table ii: Percentage Distribution, b y  Province, o f the Canadian-born, British-born and 
Foreign-born M ale Population A ged  18- 45, 1911
Province Canadian British Foreign
Prince Edward Island 1.5 0.05 0.03
Nova Scotia 7.7 2.8 1.4
New Brunswick 5.8 0.8 0.7
Quebec 30.8 7.5 8.6
Ontario 37 34.9 21.2
Manitoba 4.5 13 10.9
Saskatchewan 5.5 12.7 19.3
Alberta 3.3 10.4 17.6
British Columbia 3.7 17.9 20.4
Canada 100 100 100
Source: Canada Year Book 1918, Table 12
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Table in: Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force
Province
Place o f B irth * Place o f E n listm ent**
N um ber % o f to ta l
% o f Canadian- 
bo rn N um ber % o f to ta l
PEI 7168 1.2 2.2 3696 0.6
N ova Scotia 32580 5.3 10.2 35723 5.8
New  Brunswick 24430 3.9 7.7 27061 4.4
Q uebec 67892 11 21.3 88052 14.2
O ntario 153029 24.7 48 242655 39.2
M anitoba 18364 3 5.8 66240 10.7
Saskatchewan 4763 0.8 1.5 41689 6.7
Alberta 3330 0.5 1 48885 7.9
British Columbia*** 7110 1.1 2.2 55570 9
N W T 62 0 0
C anada 318728 51.4 100 609571 98.4
UK**** 237586 38.3 3079 0.5
USA 35599 5.7 6986 1.1
O ther 23906 3.9 0
U nknow n 3817 0.6 0
Total 619636 100 619636 100
Table includes 2,854 nursing sisters (Nicholson, 1975) and all enlistment to the end o f May, 1920.
* RG 24 H Q 64-1-24, Vol 22 1842, F10-42. Letter from F.L. Armstrong to the Adjutant General, 6 
December, 1927, indicating ‘the above figures are official.
** RG 24 H Q 64-1-24, Vol. 22. 1842, F10-42 and 1892 No. 109.
*** Includes 19 men born in the Yukon Territory
**** Includes 3,296 Newfoundlanders. In the tabulations used as the basis for this, and other tables 
in this paper, ‘British’ and ‘British possessions’ include the following places: England, Scotland, 
Ireland, Wales, Newfoundland, Australia, Tasmania, N ew  Zealand, British South Africa, British 
Africa other than South Africa, British Guiana, British India and ‘other British countries’. RG24 
10-47E (GAQ) and H Q  64-1-24, Vol. 27, Ff. 288, 287.
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Table iv: Urban and Rural Population in Canada, 1911 and Increase 1901-1911
Province
Percent Urban Percent Change
1900 1911 Urban Total
Prince Edward Island 14.5 16 0.1 9.3
Nova Scotia 28.2 37.8 43.9 17.6
New Brunswick 23.3 28.3 28.8 7.2
Quebec 39.8 48.5 47.9 21.5
Ontario 42.9 52.6 41.9 20.4
Manitoba 27.6 44 184.3 78.5
Saskatchewan 19.2 26.7 648.5 439.5
Alberta 28.2 37.9 588.2 413.1
British Columbia 50.5 51.9 125.9 119.7
Canada 37.6 45.5 62.3 34.2
Table v: Spearman Rank Correlations Between Provinces
a. Enlistment rates and demographic characteristics (p value, one-tailed)
C a n ad ia n -b o rn B ritish -b o rn  m ales P ercen t o f C anad ian
m ales as % of as % o f eligible m ale s 18-45
eligible p o p u la tio n p o p u la tio n m a rr ie d
V oluntary enlistm ent as % of eligible population -0.500 (.104)* .738 (.018)* -.333 (.210)*
Total enlistm ent as % of eligible population -.667 (.050) .783 (.013) -.233 (.546)
b. Enlistment and urban characteristics
Volunteers as % 
o f  enlistm ent Total enlistm ent
% o f  eligible  
Canadian-born
% o f  e ligib le  
British-born
% o f  Canadian 
m ales 18-45 
married
% o f  population urban .261 (.266)* .670 (.024) -.433 (.122) .517 (.077) .267 (.244)
% urban  change 1900-1911 .427 (.146)* -.173 (.328) -.867 (.001) .783 (.006) -.600 (.044)
For eight provinces. Prince Edward Island and N ova Scotia are combined
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Table vii: Married Canadian-Born Men as Percent of Males 2 0-45  by 5-year age groups
P ro v in ce 20-45 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Prince  E dw ard  Island 45.4 9 34.4 56.7 69.9 76.5
N ova Scotia 50.6 13.2 41.5 62.8 73.8 78.5
N ew  Brunsw ick 53.9 15.8 47.5 66.9 76.4 79.8
Q uebec 59.6 20.1 60 76.1 83.1 84.5
O n tario 54 18.3 47.4 65.6 74.8 78.5
M anitoba 48.3 11.4 40 65.9 74.7 79.5
Saskatchew an 43.2 11.3 35.8 55.4 68.9 76.2
A lberta 45 19.8 34.3 53.8 63.3 72.7
B ritish C o lum bia 42.1 21.5 30.6 46.4 56.7 64
C an ad a 53.7 17.7 47.3 65.6 75.8 79.6
Source: Unprinted Session Paper 194, R.H. Coates, Dom inion Statistician and Controller o f the 
Census, 12 June, 1917.
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Table viii: The Results of the Military Service Act 1917
S ta tu s o f M en N u m b e r
Class I Registrations 401822
Granted exemption 221949
Liable for Military Service 179933
Unapprehended defaulters: 24,139 
Available but not called: 26,225
Reported for Military Service 129569
Permitted to enlist in Imperial forces* 8445
Taken on strength CEF 124588
Performed no military service and struck off strength upon 
being found medially unfit, eligible for exemption or liable 
for non-combatant service only
16300
Available for service with CEF units 108288
Discharged prior to 11 Nov 1918 **8637
On strength CEF, 11 Nov 1918 ***99,651
Proceeded overseas 47509
Taken on strength units in France 24132
Source: Nicholson (1962: 551)
* RAF, Royal Engineers Inland Water Transport and other units.
** This number is explained by Nicholson (1962: 553). In addition to the 24,933 m en on leave 
o f absence (see note below), European War Memorandum #6 indicates that ‘at the signing o f the 
Armistice there were 10,296 on ‘compassionate leave while in addition there were some 6,000 on 
harvest leave’. Thus about 16,296 o f the 24,933 were on either harvest or compassionate leave on 11 
November, 1918. It seems reasonable to conclude that the remaining 8,637 had been discharged 
prior to the Armistice.
*** The most commonly-rep or ted number is 83,355 which appeared in European War 
Memorandum #6 (Sessional Paper 179, tabled 28 May, 1920). However, an important qualifying 
statement is generally overlooked or ignored. This reveals that in addition to the 83,355 ‘there were 
also 24,933 on leave without pay under the Orders in Council relating to compassionate leave and 
hardship cases, or subsequently discharged, making a total o f 108,288’. Furthermore, the Report o f 
the Director o f the M ilitary Service Branch notes that none o f the reported figures included 26,225 
men whose applications for exemption had finally been refused, and w ho were, therefore, available 
for call-up at the time o f the Armistice.
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Table ix: C
om
position of the CE
F by Place of Birth
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Table x: Components of the CEF as a percent of men by place of birth
N u m b er  o f  
en listm en ts
First
C ontingent+
V olunteers to 
31 O ct/17
Total
V olunteers
CEF Overseas MSA Total CEF
C anad ian 318728 34 44.9 45.5 47 75.6 51.4
British* 237586 64 49.1 44.6 44.8 12.9 37.8
O ther 63322 6 6 9.9 7.7 11.5 10.8
Total 619636 36267 439806 497490 424589 122146 100
* Including the British Isles and colonies.
Table xi: Components of the CEF as a Percent of Eligible Male Population by Place of Birth
E lig ib le
First
C ontin gen t
Volunteers** to 
31 O ct/17
Total
V olunteers
CEF O verseas MSA Total CEF
C anad ian 1113244 0.98 17.7 20.3 17.9 8.3 28.6
British* 307419 7.6 70.2 72.1 62.6 5.1 77.3
O ther 116509 1.9 22.8 42.3 28 12 51.1
Total 1537172 2.3 28.6 32.6 27.6 7.9 40.3
* Including the British Isles and colonies
** The M SA came into force on 13 October 1917. Recruiting was practically at a standstill at that date, 
and M SA recruits were not available for some time after it, so ‘it may be taken that the figures up to 
31 October 1917 represent accurately the volunteer effort. Note by ‘EC.’ in H Q 64-1-24, Vol. 23, F. 35. 
+ Figures compiled in 1936 modified the earlier statements about the origins o f this group ‘particularly 
in respect to U.S. born’. (RG24, CEF Personnel -  Statistics, 10-47e. A  handwritten note says ‘copied 
from H Q  64-1-24, Vol. 22). The revised table gives the origin o f 30,617 men, approximately the 
number who sailed in the first convoy o f 3 October, 1914 as: Canada, 29.9; British Isles, 60.4; Other 
British possessions, 2.2; U.S.A., 2.5; Other foreign, 3.4; Not stated, 3.4 percent.
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Table xii: CEF Nationality and Area of Service
Nationality Total CEF O/S service Home service
% o f group 
overseas
Canadian 318728 199652 119076 62.6
Newfoundland 3296 2288 3, 296 69.4
English 156697 127571 29, 126 81.4
Scottish 47427 39548 7, 879 83.4
Welsh 4719 3773 946 80
Irish 19327 14536 4791 52.2
Other British 6120 4653 1467 76
Total British 237586 192369 47505 81
American 35599 19966 15633 56.1
Other foreign 23906 12575 11 ,391 52.4
Total foreign 59505 32481 27024 54.6
Not stated 3817 87 3730 2.3
Total 619636 424589 195, 047 68.5
Source: M ilitia and Defense Records, H Q  64-1-24, vol. 25, F. 123. Maj. C.R. Scott, Assistant Director 
o f Records for the Adjutant-General, to A.M . Anderson, Esq., Vancouver, B.C. 3 October, 1929
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